The Voice of Russia
“There might be some tensions that will rise because the position of not only Russia but also of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on what the addition of these forces and how long they are going to stay in Azerbaijan and what’s the strategic intent of forces that are using Azerbaijan as a hub – these issues will all come to the forefront,” Theodore Karasik, director of research and consultancy at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis based in Dubai, told the Voice of Russia.
Ted, thank you so much for joining us. Just to start our interview I would like to quote a recent statement made by NATO Liaison Officer in the South Caucasus region William Lahue who said that Azerbaijan is a part of the process of the withdrawal because this country is potentially “the most suitable country in terms of its geographical position for the withdrawal of the contingent.” With NATO personnel in Azerbaijan, how could that affect the situation in Azerbaijan and the situation around it?
The situation in the Caucasus may become impacted by what happens during the withdrawal from Afghanistan and afterwards. The issue is that there are Azerbaijanis as well as other folks coming from the Northern Caucasus who have fought or are fighting in the northwest frontier province or in Afghanistan proper. And these are Al Qaeda sympathizers and once troops withdraw from Afghanistan, it is possible that these folks may go back to their home countries in order to inspire other radicals there to commit violence.
So, first of all, is that correct to presume that perhaps in the course of withdrawal some NATO forces could appear in the territory of Azerbaijan?
As they are withdrawing from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan may become a transit way for the withdrawal process because there has to be a number of different routes out for the equipment and the personnel that are in Afghanistan now. Some of it, like as what happened in Iraq, will be left behind for the Afghan Government to use. However, there are materials and personnel, as I said, that need to be withdrawn and Azerbaijan might actually be a good pivot or a hub distribution point for a lot of these forces since some of them are going back to Europe.
The reason I got so interested with this scenario was that Azerbaijan traditionally has rather difficult relationship with Iran which is, shall we say, not so far from Azerbaijan. Do you think that perhaps somehow the situation when some of more anti-Iranian forces feel that they could be protected by an outside force, could it embolden them in a way?
I think it is very clever for the West to use Azerbaijan as a hub because if the situation in Iran ever gets dicey or there needs to be more pressure put on Tehran or that there needs to be some kind of military action Azerbaijan would be a good deployment field.
Ted, but on the other hand if the situation in Azerbaijan somehow destabilizes, there are a lot of business interests located in Azerbaijan, business interests of the Western countries and I’m referring to oil and gas sector, so wouldn’t it somehow create additional risks for those interests?
It very well may happen but I think we have to remember that there are other hub states, for example the UAE, where there is a pretty high military presence and operations that are being conducted in and out of Afghanistan, yet the oil industry is healthy.
I’m talking about internal Caucasian problem, could they become more acute somehow with that kind of scenario?
There might be some tensions that will rise because the position of not only Russia but also of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on what the addition of these forces and how long they are going to stay in Azerbaijan and what’s the strategic intent of forces that are using Azerbaijan as a hub – these issues will all come to the forefront and will have to be negotiated and what is the actual intent of having forces transit through Azerbaijan.
What is the current situation with the Azerbaijani diaspora in Iran, is there any?
Yes, actually there is quite a large population, in the millions. And the situation is that for the Iranians their population in Iran constitutes sometimes a fifth column. And you’ll hear stories or reports about additional security being placed within that community in order to keep them under control. This community in Iran sees Azerbaijan country something like a homeland for them and in the perfect scenario for them they would be able to break away from Iran proper in order to create a greater Azerbaijan.
Would Azerbaijani Government and leadership be happy with this kind of development?
I think the expansion of territory might be interesting to them and fruitful but to have this scenario come around I think, the probability of this is probably below 10%.
Definitely Azerbaijan is not the only country to get somehow involved into the withdrawal process. And I remember you telling me that the situation in Central Asia is going to get more complicated with the withdrawal. Could you expand a little bit on that state by state? If we are talking about the Shia states, let’s look at Tajikistan for instance.
Well, Tajikistan as a state that actually borders Afghanistan is already feeling the brunt of a potential withdrawal from Afghanistan. You do have fighters coming from Afghanistan who are operating in the mountain areas outside of the capital of Dushanbe. This is a very serious development. And so this Jihadist threat, if you will, is already present there in that country and makes it a strategic pivot from being able to mitigate this further spread of Jihadi fighters into Central Asia, particularly in the 2014 to 2016 period.
Ted, remember when we were watching developments in Iraq, and at that time there was a certain threat coming from the Shia community, a party that appeared to be instrumental in resolving this issue was Iran. Do you think that in this case Iran also could be instrumental?
It is a very good question. I think at this juncture Iran’s footprint in Central Asia is not as great as in Iraq and therefore Tehran would not have the capabilities that it did in the Iraqi scenario. Having said that, you can never say never about Iranian intentions and it is quite possible that maybe the Government in Dushanbe would welcome some kind of assistance. But what that assistance would be is completely different than what we saw in Iraq.
Now, at the end of last week, at the Munich Conference Mr. Biden, well, we all know that’s a much discussed issue, has made a statement indicating that perhaps the US could be prepared for direct talks with Iran. Could that approach of engaging Iran be on the table for the US Administration now?
It is on the table for the US Administration but it scares many of the US’s Arab allies that there would be some kind of bilateral agreement or what’s called a grand strategic bargain where the US and Iran would bury the hatchet on many different issues. The probability of this happening I think is low because of the implications for geopolitics and geostrategy throughout the Gulf region but also ultimately it would impact the Central Asian states and what would happen there in terms of security and the differences between Russia and China, and Iran, and the US over which direction these governments and the resources of these governments will go.
Well, we all know that there is a strong Iranian presence in Central Asian states, even in such seemingly remote locations like Kirgizstan for instance, not mentioning other Central Asian states. So, what could be the implications of the withdrawal from Afghanistan for those states? And how could further relations in the given circumstances between those states and Iran develop?
Actually I think that Iran’s footprint in Central Asia is not as great because of not only Russian influence but also because of the nature of religion. The Central Asian states, excluding Tajikistan, and even Tajikistan is not quite a perfect example of Shiite Islam, but the rest of them are from the Sunni school. And maybe it is more a case that Iranian businesses, and they are very small, are present in the states like Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan. And so we have to be very careful about how Iran is interpreted in Central Asia and what the US may ultimately think of that presence if it starts to grow.
Having said that point we have to remember that Iran is very good at setting up businesses in other states, particularly in countries like Lebanon or Iraq and so on. Despite the sanctions regimes they may be able to set up certain companies in the Central Asian states, particularly Kirgizstan, if they see it as being politically expedient.
Just a small remark, you were telling me about the religious Shia- Sunni divide. But recently some Indian experts were telling me about low profile or rather behind the scenes contacts between the US and Iran in the territory of Turkey. Turkey seems to be helping developing those contacts which is a Sunni country. So, is the divide really that great?
Well, I’m just talking about the acceptance of Iranian business and\or religious strictures in those states. And I think that it can be problematic in terms of a sectarian divide. But if Turkey as a ME country acting as a conduit is perfectly normal between the US and Iran to have a third party act as a go-between. In the past we’ve seen other countries in that position, European countries and in some minor cases also Russia.
And Turkey as far as I understand, and please correct me if I’m wrong, Turkey seems to be spreading its influence over those Central Asian countries, I mean it is opening its schools, it is investing into businesses, it is investing into creating some kind of religious communities. So, the question is – what would you identify as the challenges to Central Asian republics after the NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan? And would Turkey’s and other international players’ interests in those republics be somehow affected?
I think in the scenario of the withdrawal from Afghanistan you are going to see many countries try to come with aid to the Central Asian states because they will be under the threat of possible ungovernability in Afghanistan and how that spreads northward. I think you are going to see more Chinese presence, more Russian presence, particularly this is the critical issue for the Kremlin because they don’t want to see any more type of violence occurring in other areas of the Russian Federation that have already happened and to see that spread. I think also you’ll see Turkey, as you mentioned correctly, become more deeply involved in assisting the Central Asian states and helping to protect them.
I think the one player that you are going to see almost disappear from the scene is the US because this is a mission too far for Washington DC right now. The US does not have the money to pay for missions abroad like this. And we are already seeing the result of the money issue with what’s happening in the Gulf region because they’ve had very publically announced that the US can no longer support two aircraft carriers in the region, that they only support one. And on top of that is the fact that the US is more interested in what’s happening in the Far East than anywhere else in the world. So, Central Asia will be left up to other allies to manage.
However I think there is another quiet player who seems to be keeping low profile but nevertheless it is quite an important player which is China.
Absolutely!
What could be the Chinese position in that issue?
China increasingly is becoming a major player in the sense of the energy issue, as well as trying to define the borders and to protect the borders because they don’t want to see anything from Central Asia infecting their country. And so, their vested interest is to be able to make sure that energy resources are kept open and flowing towards China. They will probably act through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization if that institution becomes more mature because right now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is more of a debate club than anything else. There are some exercises that occur, but are these exercises really geared to the proper threat that these countries all need to respond to? So, we have to see what will happen in the next couple of years in terms of that capability and the actual role of the Chinese on the ground in Central Asia itself.
Ted, what could be the implications for Pakistan?
For Pakistan it is going to be a critical time because Pakistan has always used Afghanistan as its backyard proxy if you will. And because of the nature of governance in Pakistan the transition to perhaps a Taliban-led Government eventually in Afghanistan will have an impact on Pakistan proper. Pakistan in my opinion is an unstable state, it can swing in a number of different directions and the impact of having the Taliban back in power in Afghanistan may further divide the country in terms of vulcanization process.
And there is one more issue which is really affecting the countries of the region, China and my own country which is drug trade. What could happen to drug trade after the NATO leaves?
It is a very good question because ironically under the NATO supervision of Afghanistan drug trade exploded with a great amount of exports of narcotics from Afghanistan proper. Under the Taliban that had actually dropped. So, the question is will the Taliban, if they takeover, or any future Afghan Government be able to control the flow of drugs coming from Afghanistan. And that’s going to be the big challenge because if the situation continues with this massive drug export program from Afghanistan, there is going to have to be more robust on the ground counternarcotics programs in Central Asia in order to prevent this situation from ongoing.
Incidentally one of the regional experts was telling me that Iran manages to somehow get hold of 90% of drugs which is about to be imported into its territory. Is this a correct estimate?
I think that’s pretty much correct because Iran is a major conduit for narcotics. They do have a robust program because narcotics use in Iran is a major social problem and the Iranian Government is desperately trying to mitigate that threat, particularly in the eastern parts of the country which border Afghanistan. So, I think if their mitigation program is around 90%, I think it is probably not far from the truth giving 10%.
Could we somehow engage Iran into cooperation in that area?
There has been cooperation with Iran in counternarcotics in the past. I believe that there was some interaction in that area during the mid 2000 period before the latest downturn in US-Iranian relations. But I think that this is one of the soft power areas that could help bring Iran back into the community of nations or the family of nations is this exact issue of fighting the drugs problem with joint efforts to stop this issue.
Ted, and finally, what happens to all the military equipment and personnel now stationed in Afghanistan?
Just like what happened in Iraq some of it will be left behind as a gift, some of it will be sold to the Afghanis but at a very cut-rate price. The very valuable stuff that is probably seen as can’t be given to a foreign Government because of the technical level of the equipment, it will be withdrawn and taken back to the US or the other countries where this equipment originated from.
And how about the personnel?
The personnel in Afghanistan will all be withdrawn and then there will be the beginning of advisory programs from various states. And that will take over a part of what would be seen as the NGO mission.
The reason I was asking about the personnel is that there are rumors in the expert community that some of the personnel is going to be simply relocated closer to the Asian-Pacific region. Are these rumors correct or not?
I wouldn’t be surprised, given the shift of the strategic focus, I would give that argument some credence.
Ted, thank you so much. And just to remind you our guest speaker was Theodore Karasik – director of research and consultancy at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, based in Dubai.
